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 Vibrant and evolving diversity has become an integral part of Canadian identity. 
Communities are experiencing an enrichment of new ideas, and unique opportunities to learn 
about those with whom we share the world. At the same time, we are witness to emerging 
tensions and value conflicts - especially in the health care system. This has given rise to what 
some have termed the problem of pluralism: the challenges associated with formulating public 
policy and shaping health care practices for parties who have deep moral disagreements. 
  It has been proposed that the practice of informed consent in health care is an effective 
solution to the problem of pluralism, as it allows individuals to make decisions according to their 
own moral commitments and control the care they receive. In this thesis, I argue that informed 
consent is not a value-neutral practice. Rather, it is grounded in particular values and beliefs, and 
reflects a particular understanding of health and illness. Consequently, I argue that the practice 
may not be able to fully address the problem of pluralism. 
 I begin by exploring the dynamics of ethical pluralism and the structure of the health care 
system in Canada. I focus, specifically, on the challenges that arise from this complex 
intersection of ethics and health. Next, I establish the ways in which the practice of informed 
consent is embedded with particular values. Finally, I discuss strategies for making the practice 
of informed consent more accommodating of diversity. I argue that there are, however, limits to 
the possible accommodations that can be made, due to the complexity of the issues and the 
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Chapter 1: Ethical Pluralism in Canadian Health Care 
1.1 Introduction 
 Canada is home to increasing diversity. Communities are experiencing an enrichment of 
new ideas and different ways of life. As Canadians, we see growth and change, and are presented 
with new and unique opportunities to learn about those with whom we share the world. At the 
same time, we are witness to rising tensions and value conflicts that we may not feel equipped to 
address. The health care system, educational system, and other long-standing institutions are 
called into question as we work to ensure that each person is able to live according to their 
beliefs and values - that is, to live their good life.   
 Reflecting on this issue, I am met with many questions: How is the practice of informed 
consent in health care rooted in values? In what ways can we work to accommodate ethical 
pluralism in Canadian health care? Are there limits to this possible accommodation? It is on 
these questions that my work will focus. I will give arguments demonstrating that the practice of 
informed consent in Canada is grounded in particular values, beliefs, and assumptions. I will 
explore ways of easing the growing tension, and put forth strategies to accommodate ethical 
pluralism in the health care system. Finally, I will establish that there are, in fact, limits to the 
accommodation that can be provided in health care. 
 In this opening chapter, I aim to build a comprehensive foundation for my project. I will 
offer background information on the topic, and explain the key concepts that will be central to 
my arguments. To start, I will explore the vibrant and evolving diversity that has become an 
integral part of Canadian identity. Next, I will introduce the concept of ethical pluralism, 
drawing on the work of John Rawls to highlight the ways in which distinct value systems emerge 
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and exist in relation to one another. With this in mind, I will discuss the presence of ethical 
pluralism in the Canadian health care system, and the accompanying challenges (sometimes 
referred to as the problem of pluralism) that can arise from this interaction. I will, then, shift my 
focus to the work of Donald Ainslie, and explain his proposed solution for accommodating 
pluralism in health care settings. Finally, I will describe the practice of informed consent as it 
exists in the Canadian context, focusing specifically on its role in the health care system. 
 In Chapter 2, I will argue that informed consent in Canada is not a neutral practice. It is 
grounded in particular values and normative beliefs, and is informed by a particular 
understanding of health and illness. Accordingly, different patients will have different 
perceptions and experiences of the process of informed consent, depending on their moral views. 
As a consequence, it is my position that informed consent may not be able to fully address the 
problem of pluralism.  
 To establish my argument, I will explore three ways in which the process of informed 
consent in Canada is value-laden. To start, I will demonstrate that the practice is embedded with 
communication and decision-making norms that are not universal. In this way, informed consent 
emphasizes individual choice and autonomy over collective or family-centered decision-making. 
It also assumes that patients and families value full disclosure and open communication with 
their health care team. In reality, there are many moral communities for whom this kind of 
relationship is seen as inappropriate.  
 Next, I will call attention to the fact that there is a substantial power imbalance between 
patients and health care professionals. The latter hold notable positions of authority in society as 
a result of their medical knowledge and training, and control over access to treatments and 
services. In the current practice of informed consent in Canada, it is taken for granted that 
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patients have various inclinations towards authority - whether it be deference, neutrality, or 
distrust. I will argue that these inclinations can have repercussions for how patients perceive their 
relationships with health care professionals, and their ultimate decisions to accept or reject 
treatment.  
 Last, the practice of medicine may be supported by objective, empirical facts, but it also 
relies on the judgements of health care professionals. These judgements may be shaped by health 
care professionals' normative beliefs about health, illness, and dying, and can influence how they 
direct the process of informed consent for patients. Specifically, I will argue that a health care 
professional's judgements about a case may affect how they determine prognoses, what 
information they deem  relevant to disclose to a patient, how that information is presented, and 
what treatment recommendations they believe to be appropriate. 
 In Chapter 3, I will discuss strategies for accommodating ethical pluralism in the 
Canadian practice of informed consent. I will start by arguing that medical practice should be 
rooted in an active resistance of assumptions. I will detail methods through which health care 
professionals can avoid relying on stereotypes, and approach patients with an awareness that they 
are complex, unique individuals. Central to my argument is the assertion that health care 
professionals must have the opportunity to learn about their patient's values and beliefs before 
beginning any discussion of the patient's condition. 
 Next, I will explore the idea of a 'lower' standard of informed consent as a mechanism for 
accommodating patients and families who value non-disclosure. Such a practice could be 
implemented in various possible forms. This 'lower' standard of informed consent would allow 
patients to choose to receive less information about their condition, in order to ensure that their 
care aligns with their values. In addition, I will present strategies for addressing patients' 
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deference or distrust towards authority. I will discuss training for health care professionals 
focusing on issues of trust, authority, and power. Such training would equip health care 
professionals with the tools to engage in meaningful collaboration with patients. 
 Finally, I will suggest that there may be limits to the possible accommodation of ethical 
pluralism within Canadian health care. This may be the case for patient requests that incur 
substantial costs, interfere with care, or violate professional or legal standards. Due to the 
complexity of these issues, and the structure of the health care system, it is my position that some 
tensions cannot be resolved. With this in mind, I will begin to build the foundation for my 
arguments. I will start this opening chapter with a exploration of ethical pluralism in the 
Canadian context. 
1.2 Canadian Diversity 
A great diversity of moral views can be clearly seen in Canada. The country is home to a 
rich mosaic of diversity, due to its immigrant and Indigenous populations. This growing diversity 
exists along linguistic, religious, cultural, and ethnic dimensions. Historic French influence has 
created French-English duality in Canada, with the country being officially bilingual. Canada is 
also host to a mix of religious presence. Christian faiths are the most common, but non-Christian 
faiths such as Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh faiths are certainly on the rise (Statistics Canada). In 
terms of ethno-cultural diversity, the majority of Canadians identify their ancestry as ‘Canadian’. 
Only Indigenous populations, though, are actually native to the country. Interestingly, in 2011, 
there were 13 ethnic origins that surpassed the 1-million mark. In terms of recent immigrants, 
Canadians reported nearly 200 countries as their places of birth. At the time of the 2011 Census, 
20.6% of the population was foreign-born. In this respect, internationally, Canada is second only 
to Australia (Statistics Canada). 
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 Internationally, Canada’s efforts to become a country of diversity and acceptance have 
earned it a reputation as a successful example of a pluralist society. In 1971, Canada was the first 
country in the world to introduce official policy on multiculturalism. As a result of this initiative, 
the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (CMA) was enacted in 1988. The CMA declared that it is the 
official policy of the Government of Canada to support the country’s growing diversity by 
ensuring that all individuals have equal rights, receive fair treatment, and are able to participate 
fully in the shaping of Canadian society.  
 The country’s achievements on this front certainly call for celebration, but it is important 
to acknowledge that Canada is still a work in progress, and faces ongoing challenges. The urgent 
need for continued work is especially visible when one examines the past and present treatment 
of Canada’s Indigenous populations. In particular, there is grave injustice in the conditions of 
Indigenous peoples’ housing, education, employment, and health (Sawchuk 2). So, the country 
continues to work towards equality and inclusivity. With policies dedicated to supporting 
multiculturalism, it seems that diversity itself has become an essential part of the collective 
Canadian identity (Boutilier 3). 
 An especially striking illustration of this diversity in Canada can be seen in health care 
settings, where there are deep and unsettled disagreements about many ethical issues. Sure 
enough, “individuals from quite different ethnic backgrounds, with distinct personal narratives 
and communal histories, can encounter one another in the oncology unit, burn centre, obstetrics 
unit, hospice or critical care facility” (Turner 104). Each of these individuals will have their own 
moral doctrine that can greatly affect their experience as a health care consumer. Their beliefs 
may influence the way they understand health, illness, injury, and death.  
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 Practically, this might mean that patients have remarkably different convictions about 
issues like advance directives, the disclosure of prognoses, the administering of treatment, and 
end of life care. In some cultures, for example, it is believed that reality is shaped by language, 
and the discussion of certain events can cause them to manifest (Goce and Zola 3). In fact, 
according to a European folk belief, if a pregnant women is to see or even think of a person with 
a disability, they 'mark' their unborn child with the same impairment (Groce and Zola 3). 
Consequently, a patient who holds these beliefs may find it inappropriate for a health care 
professional to speak to them about illness, injury, or death.  
 Another illustration of the diversity in moral beliefs can be seen by looking to a moral 
community on Vanatinai, a small island near Papua New Guinea. In this community, those who 
(by Western standards), would be seen as unconscious, are actually viewed as already dead 
(Koenig and Gates-Williams 3). So, for members of this community, a person may die many 
times (Koenig and Gates-Williams 3). A patient in Canadian health care who holds such beliefs 
may have a vastly different understanding of particular conditions, and so, different expectations 
for treatment options and end of life care. In all, patients' beliefs and values may affect the way 
they understand and experience illness or injury, as well as their expectations and goals for care. 
In this way, health care settings are rich with illustrations of the vast ethical diversity in Canada.   
1.3 Ethical Pluralism 
 Ethical pluralism, put simply, is the idea that there are many different value systems in 
the world, because of different perspectives on moral issues. Between value systems (or, moral 
doctrines), there can be tremendous variation in the beliefs, practices and values that are 
considered acceptable and morally defensible (Turner 102). Consider, for example, the range of 
contrasting religious beliefs related to eating meat. Evidently, two moral communities may 
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interpret a given practice in two entirely different ways depending on the norms and values of the 
moral doctrine to which they subscribe.  
 There can also be great diversity among the individual members of a particular moral 
community. Individuals may differ in the way that they interpret or practice the community's 
moral beliefs and values, resulting in considerable inter-group variation. So, while a moral 
community may have a shared value system or moral doctrine, it cannot be taken for granted that 
the community's individual members are homogenous. Accordingly, it is important to avoid 
making assumptions about any particular individual based on their membership in a moral 
community. In all, there is tremendous diversity to be found between, and within, communities. 
This is because, as Leigh Turner suggests, moral communities have different “ways of 
worldmaking” (Turner 103) 
 So, how is it that these diverse ways of worldmaking come to be? How is it that “without 
making any factual or logical errors, individuals who live in free societies will arrive at distinct 
and conflicting views about how best to live and about the demands of morality”? (Weijer et al. 
199). The existence of ethical pluralism has made for fascinating explorations by many notable 
thinkers. John Rawls, for instance, has written thoughtfully about this topic. In his work, Rawls 
explores various ways that individuals may come to disagree about moral issues. In what 
follows, I will discuss three of the factors that are believed to affect the position an individual 
takes on an issue.   
 First, for any given case, parties may evaluate and understand the available evidence 
differently (Rawls 36). This may be because the evidence is complex, or because there are a 
number of pieces of evidence that conflict with one another. Second, it could be that parties 
agree on the relevant considerations for an issue, but disagree about their order of importance 
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(Rawls 37). Take, for instance, the issue of abortion. Often, both pro-life and pro-choice 
supporters see the value of preservation of life and bodily autonomy; their disagreement, 
however, stems from their views about which value should take priority in a situation where both 
are at stake. Third, one’s position on an issue is often affected by their beliefs and life experience 
(Rawls 37). The way one prioritizes values and weighs evidence for an issue may be affected by 
their moral beliefs, culture, religion, ethnicity, social position and family structure – among 
others. 
 In further writing, Rawls asserts that pluralism is a permanent feature of any democratic 
society (Rawls 84). He explains, saying, “In a modern democratic society citizens affirm 
different, and indeed incommensurable and irreconcilable, though reasonable, comprehensive 
doctrines in the light of which they understand their conceptions of the good” (Rawls 84). Ethical 
pluralism is visible in disagreements about moral issues, like the significance of one’s body, 
one’s duty to help others, or what it means to achieve justice. In contemporary Canadian society, 
one can discover the depth of pluralism in the deliberations about women’s reproductive rights or 
our environmental responsibilities. A feature of ethical pluralism is the existence of conflicting 
moral principles. These conflicting principles may exist between distinct moral doctrines, or may 
be present within a single moral doctrine. Regardless of how a particular value- conflict arises, it 
can often be traced to deep-rooted beliefs, which can, undoubtedly, create significant tension 
(Hare 35). 
1.4 The Problem of Pluralism in Health Care 
 The difficulty, I argue, is that this deep moral disagreement makes it difficult to formulate 
public policy or shape health care practices. The creation and implementation of such guidelines 
affect not only health care professionals, patients, and family members, but the larger society, as 
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well. Take a moment to reflect on the debate surrounding an issue like abortion, or medical 
assistance in dying. Imagine trying to create a policy that individuals on all sides of the debate 
would find tolerable. It is my position that there is profound complexity to such a task, making it 
remarkably difficult – if not impossible.   
 I believe that this complexity exists because, if policy-makers or health care professionals 
are to act fairly, then there is no single moral doctrine on which they can rely for guidance. 
Within a unified moral community, one can usually appeal to an accepted moral authority (like a 
sacred text or religious doctrine) to make their case. But, in a pluralistic society, members of the 
population do not agree on a single moral doctrine. When developing policy or practices, then, 
there is no ultimate moral authority on which decisions can be based.  
 To endorse a single moral doctrine “would be unfair to those who subscribe to a 
conflicting reasonable doctrine; it would mean that the coercive power of the state would not be 
justified to them in terms they can accept, even while they are forced to abide by its terms” 
(Ainslie 1). If a policy is to place limits on the kind of lives that people can lead, it must be 
justified to those very people who will be affected (Ainslie 13). It must be shown that people 
have reason to accept these limits, despite their moral disagreements. To do otherwise, and force 
individuals to abide by moral principles in which they do not believe, would be unjust. Thus, 
policy-makers and health care professionals are assigned complex tasks. The former must work 
to craft policy that is fair, and can be justified to a diverse population, despite deep-rooted moral 
disagreements. The latter must try to navigate health care situations and provide care for pluralist 
parties who may have competing interests and goals. 
 Expanding on the last point, there are significant challenges pertaining to ethical 
pluralism and personal interactions in health care. The issue is made more complex with the 
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realization that there is ethical diversity on both sides of the patient-physician relationship. Both 
health care professionals and patients are multi-ethnic, multicultural, and pluralistic, with their 
own moral commitments, beliefs, and values. It is my position that it is crucial that both parties 
be able to act in a way that aligns with their moral convictions. I will argue that health care 
professionals ought to have control over their practice (within reasonable limits) so that they can 
act in good conscience; at the same time, patients ought to have the freedom to access - or refuse 
- treatments and services.  
 When health care professionals and patients have vastly different moral doctrines, finding 
a balance can not only be immensely difficult, but potentially hazardous. Studies have shown 
that substantial cultural differences between health care professionals and patients can lead to 
poor health outcomes for the patient (Pachter 691). This often occurs because the two parties 
have different values and beliefs, leading to differences in understandings of the patient's 
symptoms, condition, and options for treatment. Differences which, if overlooked, can jeopardize 
the therapeutic relationship and compromise communication between the health care 
professional and patient. In turn, the patient’s satisfaction with their care, and adherence to 
treatment may suffer (Pachter 691). Thus, the greater the cultural distance between the two 
parties, the more likely there is to be miscommunication or misunderstanding, resulting in a 
greater risk of poor health outcomes. 
 Concerns are further complicated by the realization that individuals can revise their moral 
doctrine at any time. As revealed by Rawls, one’s moral commitments can change for a number 
of reasons, be it life experience or the availability of new evidence. For a health care 
professional, this might mean reflecting on which services they provide and changing their 
practice. For a patient, this might mean consulting with their health care professional to ensure 
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their revised wishes are known and understood. In some health care settings where patients are 
receiving treatment over lengthy periods of time, this may be especially complex. In these cases, 
health care professionals must work diligently to ensure that they are aware of any revisions to 
the patient’s moral commitments that would affect the care they expect to receive. 
 The challenges described in the above paragraphs make up what some have termed the 
problem of pluralism. Navigating this complex intersection of health care and ethical pluralism 
has become a substantial project for those working in bioethics. Bioethics is a relatively new, 
interdisciplinary field that examines ethical issues related to biology, the environment, human 
life, and health. There is particular interest in the implications for technological advances in 
biology and medicine. For instance, bioethicists might study research allocation in health care, 
issues surrounding the beginning and end of life, research ethics, or environmental responsibility. 
More specifically, this might mean unpacking issues like organ donation, abortion, medical 
assistance in dying, non-human animal testing, or stem cell research. 
  In studying the problem of pluralism in bioethics, we are called to reflect on many 
difficult questions: How does one navigate moral deliberation about a person’s health between 
multi-ethnic, multi-faith, or otherwise pluralistic parties? How can health care practices be 
shaped so as to facilitate productive and respectful relationships between individuals that have 
vastly different moral doctrines? Instances of moral conflict in health care settings are not 
uncommon, and yet, there is little guidance about how they ought to be best addressed. 
1.5 A Proposed Solution from Donald Ainslie 
 Donald Ainslie is one thinker who has made notable contributions to the conversation 
about the problem of pluralism. In "Bioethics and the Problem of Pluralism", Ainslie analyses 
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the challenges that arise from ethical pluralism in health care, and argues that the doctrine of 
informed consent is an effective solution.  
 To start, Ainslie draws a distinction between two ethical projects. Bioethics, he explains, 
works toward creating public policy and norms for health care professionals (Ainslie 20). This 
approach to ethics is very much policy-oriented. Bioethics of everyday life, on the other hand, is 
the attempt to formulate moral principles and doctrines that help us to navigate the moral issues 
we face each day (Ainslie 2). Specifically, Ainslie is referring to the issues that stem from our 
biological nature, regarding reproduction, disease, disability, and mortality.  
 Ainslie emphasizes that policy-oriented bioethics and the bioethics of everyday life are 
not merely different approaches to an issue, but are essentially complementary tasks (Ainslie 20). 
He offers an illustration that is useful for understanding the distinction between these two ethical 
tasks, and their complementary nature. Consider, for example, that policy-makers are 
deliberating about when it is appropriate for health care professionals to withhold or withdraw 
life-sustaining treatment for patients (Ainslie 20). This question of policy can also be seen from 
the perspective of patients, by considering when patients can force health care professionals to 
continue or withdraw life-sustaining treatment (Ainslie 20). Although these two perspectives are 
framed in different ways, they are both primarily concerned with health care policy and 
practices.  
 There are important complementary perspectives for this issue in the bioethics of 
everyday life. These perspectives would focus on the individuals in the situation, drawing 
attention to the values and moral beliefs they might employ to navigate the issue. There may be 
questions raised about the disvalue (or value) of suffering, end of life care, preferred ways of 
dying, and one's ability to direct their own life (Ainslie 20).  
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 Ainslie suggests that while policy-oriented bioethics tend to be the focus of the 
conversation, the importance of bioethics of everyday life must not be understated. His position, 
here, is rooted in his belief that each person ought to be able to appeal to their own moral 
doctrine to guide their life (Ainslie 19). Importantly, this includes drawing on their own moral 
principles when making decisions about their health care. A consequence of this is that 
individuals' moral doctrines must actually be able to provide guidance on such issues. As it 
stands, according to Ainslie, this is not the case. He argues that individuals' moral doctrines do 
not yet provide adequate guidance or support to navigate every day issues. It is for this reason 
that the bioethics of everyday life warrant further attention and examination. Without developing 
the bioethics of everyday life, Ainslie thinks, there will be little guidance for policy-oriented 
bioethics (Ainslie 20). Thus, he advances his project by exploring the values and moral beliefs 
with which individuals guide their lives. 
 Ainslie suggests that among ethically pluralist parties, there is, at least, one area of 
common ground: the value of one's body. Certainly, the level of value a person places on their 
body will vary depending on their moral doctrine; but, Ainslie thinks, every person – regardless 
of their moral beliefs – sees themselves as having a special relationship with their body (Ainslie 
16). This special relationship may be as simple as the acknowledgement that we are each 
dependent on our bodies to interact with the world, and that a harm to our body is a harm to us 
(Ainslie 16). Given this, it seems reasonable to assume that each person will want to have control 
over who they let intervene in their body. It may be, then, that this common ground is a suitable 
starting point for trying to address pluralism in health care. 
In light of this, Ainslie has expressed strong support for the doctrine of informed consent 
as an effective solution to the problem of pluralism (Ainslie 17). In his work, he argues that 
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informed consent “sets up conditions for bodily access that we can all accept, despite our 
different moral commitments” (Ainslie 17). There are two main reasons for Ainslie’s position, 
both of which I will explain below. 
 First, Ainslie emphasizes the practical value of patient autonomy, and in turn, informed 
consent. He argues that it is the only system that allows people who hold different moral 
doctrines to live together harmoniously (Ainslie 17). It is the only way, he thinks, to order the 
health care system in a way that respects each person’s moral commitments without interfering 
with the commitments of anyone else. Ainslie claims that informed consent protects each 
person’s right to make their own decisions about their body – regardless of what that decision is, 
in the end (Ainslie 17).  
 To be clear, Ainslie is arguing that informed consent is valuable in a pragmatic sense 
(Ainslie 17). This is important to note because it distinguishes his view from those who argue 
that autonomy and informed decision-making have moral value. This is to say, those who believe 
that autonomy is valuable in itself – that it simply is good. Ainslie makes no claim about the 
moral value of patient autonomy. Rather, he suggests that it is important because of what it 
enables us to do - namely, maintaining peaceful relations within pluralistic societies by allowing 
each person to make their own decisions, according to their own moral doctrine. 
 Second, Ainslie argues that the doctrine of informed consent gives individuals the most 
control over their circumstances. The wishes of the patient take priority, whether communicated 
by the capable patient themselves, or the substitute decision-maker if the patient is incapable. 
According to Ainslie, this effectively prevents patients from suffering abuse or exploitation when 
they are ill and so, especially vulnerable (Ainslie 17). Ainslie thinks that informed consent also 
ensures that individuals are in charge of how their beliefs and values are expressed in their lives. 
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This is crucial, he thinks, given the rich diversity in society. Even individuals who hold the same 
moral doctrine may weigh values differently, or have distinct understandings of what they are 
called to do in a given situation. In all, ensuring that patients have control over their care is 
especially important, as those suffering from poor health may feel dependent and vulnerable. It is 
evident that Ainslie believes the practice of informed consent to be an effective tool for 
navigating the problem of pluralism in the Canadian health care system. 
1.6 Informed Consent in Canada 
In Canada, the practice of informed consent is directed by professional and legal 
standards. The process of obtaining consent from a patient must meet certain criteria, and follow 
a series of necessary steps. In this section, I will offer a description and analysis of the way in 
which this practice functions in Canadian health care settings. First, the health care professional 
has an open discussion with the patient where they disclose all relevant information about the 
patient’s status – such as diagnosis, prognosis, treatment options and accompanying benefits or 
risks. Then, with this information, the patient is able to make their own decision about how to 
proceed, and either give or refuse consent for any or all treatment. The idea is that the patient has 
the freedom to appeal to their comprehensive moral doctrine, and choose a path that aligns with 
their moral commitments and beliefs. They are able to exercise their autonomy and maintain full 
control over what happens to their body. In the following section, I will discuss the current 
practice of informed consent in Canadian health care settings. 
 In Canada, health care services are the responsibility of both the federal and provincial or 
territorial governments. There are various mechanisms in each province or territory that serve to 
regulate the practice of medicine and maintain standards for health care professionals. In 
Ontario, the rules guiding the practice of informed consent, specifically, are detailed in the 
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Ontario Health Care Consent Act. This policy outlines the standards that health care 
professionals must meet when dealing with consent to treatment in health care settings. Here, 
‘treatment’ refers to any care that serves a health-related goal, whether it be therapeutic, 
preventive, palliative, diagnostic, or cosmetic (Health Care Consent Act). The practice is also 
monitored by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO). In their guidelines on 
consent to treatment, the CPSO states that “patient autonomy and respect for personal dignity are 
central to the provision of ethically sound care” (College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario). 
In the following section, I will unpack the guidelines for the practice of informed consent in 
Ontario. 
 In a widespread interpretation, informed consent is rooted in patient autonomy. 
Accordingly, health care professionals in Canada must obtain valid consent before they can 
proceed with any and all treatment (College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario). This means 
that a health care professional cannot administer treatment to a patient unless one of two criteria 
is met: i) the patient is capable with respect to the treatment and has given consent, or ii) the 
patient is incapable with respect to the treatment, and their substitute decision-maker has given 
consent on behalf of the incapable patient. This two-prong system appears to be fairly 
straightforward, but there are terms and ideas that must be thoroughly explained. For instance, 
what is valid consent? How does a patient come to be deemed capable or incapable with respect 
to treatment? How are substitute decision-makers selected, and what are their responsibilities? 
The nature of each of these elements can affect how the practice of informed consent responds to 
pluralism in Canadian society. 
 According to the Ontario Health Care Consent Act, consent is considered valid when it 
meets five conditions (Health Care Consent Act). First, the consent must be provided by a 
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capable patient, or the substitute decision-maker of an incapable patient. Second, the consent has 
to be related to the treatment. Third, the individual giving consent (whether this is the patient, or 
substitute-decision maker of an incapable patient) must have been made fully informed. Being 
fully-informed means that the individual understands the nature of the proposed treatment, the 
expected benefits, possible risks, possible side effects, and likely consequences of choosing to 
refuse the treatment (College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario). The goal of this condition 
is to ensure that the patient or substitute-decision maker receives all the information that “a 
reasonable person in the same circumstances would require in order to make a decision about the 
treatment” (Health Care Consent Act). Fourth, the consent must be given voluntarily, free from 
duress or coercion. Finally, the individual giving consent must not have been misguided, and the 
consent not obtained through fraud. To achieve this, health care professionals must be open and 
honest when discussion treatment options with the patient or substitute decision-maker. As the 
practice of informed consent is grounded in patient autonomy, the patient has the right to 
withdraw consent at any time – regardless of health care professionals’ recommendations - as 
long as the patient is capable at the time of the withdrawal (Health Care Consent Act). 
 Next, I will explore the policy guidelines concerning capacity. In a health care setting, a 
patient is capable with respect to treatment if i) they can understand the information relevant to 
making the decision, and ii) they can understand the possible outcomes of proceeding with or 
refusing treatment. It is important to note that the standards for capacity vary depending on the 
patient, and the gravity of the decision (Health Care Consent Act). For instance, it is possible for 
a patient to be capable with respect to choosing their dinner, but not capable with respect to 
treatment. As explained by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, “capacity is fluid, 
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it can change over time, and depends on the nature and complexity of the specific treatment 
decision” (College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario).  
 According to provincial policy, health care professionals are to presume that an adult 
patient (over the age of 18) has capacity with respect to treatment unless there is a reasonable 
basis for believing otherwise (College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario). A health care 
professional might have a reasonable basis for thinking a patient is incapable if they note that the 
patient is behaving in a bizarre or erratic manner, or demonstrating a lack of insight about their 
situation. If, at any time, a patient disagrees with their being deemed incapable, they have the 
right to apply to the Consent and Capacity Board to review the finding (College of Physicians 
and Surgeons of Ontario). 
 When a patient is deemed incapable with respect to treatment, a substitute decision-
maker is authorized to make decisions on their behalf. As per Ontario policy, only individuals 
with particular relations to an incapable patient can be considered for the position of substitute 
decision-maker. The qualifying relations are listed as follows, in order of seniority: the incapable 
patient’s i) guardian, ii) attorney for personal care, iii) representative as appointed by the HCCA 
Board, iv) spouse or partner, v) parent or child, vi) sibling, or vii) other relative (Health Care 
Consent Act). When going through the process of establishing a substitute decision-maker health 
care professionals begin with the individual at the top of the list, and work their way down until 
they have found an individual who satisfies specific requirements set out in the Health Care 
Consent Act (Health Care Consent Act). 
 To start, a substitute decision-maker must meet a minimum age requirement. They must 
be over the age of 16, unless they are the parent of the incapable patient. Next, they must be free 
from any court order or separation agreement that would prohibit them from accessing the 
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incapable patient or making a decision on their behalf. Further, the substitute decision-maker 
must be available. Under the policy guidelines, this means that it must be possible to reach them 
and have them make a decision within a reasonable amount of time, given the circumstances 
(Health Care Consent Act). Finally, the potential substitute decision-maker must be willing to 
accept the responsibility of making the decision to proceed with, or refuse treatment. 
 Once an individual is authorized as a substitute decision-maker, they must ensure that 
their decisions concerning treatment align with the most recent wishes expressed by the patient 
(at a time when they were capable) (Health Care Consent Act). If the wishes of the patient are 
not known, or impossible to comply with in the circumstances, the substitute decision-maker 
must decide in the patient’s best interests. In doing this, they are encouraged to consider the 
incapable patient’s beliefs and values, and the consequences for proceeding with or refusing 
treatment.  
 If there is a case where a health care professional believes that the substitute decision-
maker is acting against the guidelines set out in the Health Care Consent Act, they can apply to 
the Consent and Capacity Board for guidance on how the case should proceed (College of 
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario). Of course, a substitute decision-maker has the right to 
withdraw consent to treatment at any time, regardless of health care professionals’ suggestions, 
as long as the patient is incapable. Now, with a more thorough understanding of the system of 
informed consent in Canada, I will move on to explore the practice in relation to pluralism. 
 As it stands, the practice of informed consent is generally thought to be an effective tool 
for navigating the (so-called) problem of pluralism. The system is structured so that a health care 
professional gives a patient all the relevant information about their state of health, and treatment 
options. With this information, the patient can make their own decisions with regards to their 
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care. They can appeal to their comprehensive moral doctrine, and choose a path that best aligns 
with their moral commitments and beliefs. When proper procedures are followed, it seems that a 
capable patient is able to exercise their autonomy and have full control over what happens to 
their body. 
1.7 Conclusion 
 There are many ways that the practice of informed consent is useful for navigating the 
tensions that accompany ethical pluralism in health care settings. However, it is my position that 
it is an insufficient mechanism for addressing the problem of pluralism. As it stands, the practice 
of informed consent is embedded with specific values, and assumes a particular understanding of 
health and illness. In the coming chapter, I will explore the ways in which the current practice of 















Chapter 2: Informed Consent as a Value-Laden Practice 
2.1 Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, I laid the ground work for this project by exploring the concepts 
and ideas that are foundational to my argument. I examined the growing diversity in Canada, and 
the subsequent emergence of new ethical dilemmas. Specifically, I unpacked the challenge of 
accommodating ethical pluralism in the health care system, which is known as the problem of 
pluralism. I gave an account of Donald Ainslie's work on the problem of pluralism, and explored 
his argument that the doctrine of informed consent functions as an effective solution to these 
challenges. Finally, I examined the practice of informed consent in Ontario. 
 Recall, the practice of informed consent is integral to many significant elements of 
Canadian society, in particular, the health care system. In the practice of medicine and 
therapeutic research, it is critical for legal, ethical, and regulatory interactions. To review, the 
practice of informed consent calls for communication between health care professional and 
patient. Professional and legal standards require that that diagnoses, prognoses, benefits or risks 
of treatment, and alternatives to treatment are discussed. With this information, the patient makes 
the decision to accept or refuse health interventions.  
 Given the above information, it may seem that informed consent is a neutral practice. 
Health care professionals ensure that the patient is given all the information about their 
circumstances, and they are able to decide how to proceed. It appears that they are able to draw 
on their own moral doctrine, and make a decision that aligns with their values and beliefs. 
Consequently, it is assumed that informed consent is value-neutral.  
 Framed in this way, as a neutral practice, informed consent does appear to be an effective 
solution to the problem of pluralism. The central concern in the problem of pluralism, as you will 
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recall, is determining how to accommodate diverse values, beliefs, and practices into the 
structure of the health care system. If the practice of informed consent is value-neutral, then it 
appears to be a fair and equitable way for pluralist patients to engage in health care decisions. It 
facilitates accommodation for pluralist patients, and so, resolves the tension that constitutes the 
problem of pluralism. It is my view, however, that this scenario does not reflect the reality of the 
practice. 
 In this chapter, I will demonstrate that informed consent in Canadian health care is not a 
neutral practice. It is grounded in particular values and normative beliefs, and reflects a specific 
understanding of health and illness. As a result, different patients will perceive and experience 
the practice in different ways, depending on their moral doctrine. Consequently, it is my position 
that informed consent may not able to fully address the problem of pluralism.  
 There are a number of values embodied in the current process of informed consent. So, it 
seems suitable to divide this chapter into sections, each of which devoted to establishing a 
particular way that the process is value-laden. First, I will argue that the Canadian practice of 
informed consent is embedded with norms of communication and decision-making. There is a 
predominant emphasis on individual autonomy and choice, over collective or family-centered 
decision-making. Further, it is assumed that all patients want a relationship of full disclosure and 
open communication with their health care team. In many moral communities, though, this level 
of disclosure is seen as inappropriate. 
 Second, between the patient and the health care professional, the latter holds a wealth of 
authority and power. It is sometimes taken for granted that patients have various attitudes 
towards authority, whether it be deference, neutrality, or distrust. The power imbalance, then, 
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can affect how a patient perceives their relationship with the health care professional, and can 
have a direct impact on the patient’s ultimate decision to accept or reject treatment.  
 Third, although the practice of medicine is based on objective facts and empirical 
information, it also relies on the judgements of health care professionals - judgements that may 
be influenced by their normative beliefs about health, illness, and dying. Accordingly, these 
judgements can impact how health care professionals understand, and direct the practice of 
informed consent for a patient. There may be implications for what information the health care 
professional deems relevant to disclose to a patient, how they frame prognoses, or what 
recommendations they think are appropriate in a particular case.  
 Throughout this chapter, I will expand on each of the above points. I will demonstrate the 
various ways that values are embedded in the process of informed consent, establishing that the 
practice is not value-neutral.  
2.2 Decision-Making and Communication Norms 
 The literature on ethical pluralism reveals that Western bioethics is exceedingly 
individualistic (Lasser and Gottlieb 112). The practice of informed consent is traditionally rooted 
in individual autonomy and self-determination. These values are not, however, assigned the same 
weight across all moral communities. There is a great diversity of beliefs regarding what 
Christine Grady calls the “enduring and emerging challenges” of informed consent (Grady 855). 
These unsettled issues relate to what information is disclosed to patients, how information should 
be disclosed, how much the person giving consent needs to understand, and how explicit consent 
needs to be. These points of tension effectively highlight a series of values that are taken for 
granted in the process of informed consent. 
24 
 
 To start, the practice relies on specific communication norms such as full disclosure, 
open communication, and truth-telling. Additionally, it is assumed that all patients make 
decisions in a similar manner - that is, through rational risk-benefit analysis and individual 
contemplation. In exploring the literature on moral communities around the world, it is clear that 
these particular values are by no means universal. In fact, the literature reveals the prevalence of 
contrasting values. Notably, the role of family-centered decision-making and the significance of 
non-disclosure. 
 In moving forward to explore these themes, I would like to emphasize the importance of 
being cautious when making generalizations about moral communities. Often, there is significant 
inter-group variation regarding the values, attitudes, and beliefs of members. Consequently, one 
ought not to make assumptions about any particular person based on their culture, faith, 
ethnicity, or other element membership in a moral community. So, while I discuss the moral 
views of communities in this section, I acknowledge that the members of any given community 
are not all the same, and I am wary of making any generalizations to this effect. With this in 
mind, I will move on to discuss the first theme. 
 In contrast to Western individualism, many moral communities have social approaches to 
decision-making and consent. Family-centered decision-making, for instance, is particularly 
common in Asia and Latin America (Lasser 108). When a relative becomes ill, it is understood 
that family members are central agents in making decisions on their behalf – sometimes even 
when the patient is competent and capable (Turner 108). In one study, researchers conducted 
interviews in the United States and Japan to compare attitudes. They described a case in which a 
patient had been found to have cancer, but had not yet been told. Participants were asked to 
indicate who they thought the physician should disclose the diagnosis to: the patient, or the 
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family. The researchers found that 80% of Japanese physicians and 65% of Japanese patients 
believed the physician should inform the family of the diagnosis, and allow them to decide 
whether or not to tell the patient (Ruhnke et al 1174). In stark contrast, only 6% of US physicians 
and 22% of US patients agreed that the physician should disclose only to the family (Ruhnke et 
al 1174). 
 Such findings reveal tremendous variation in attitudes towards decision-making roles. 
They substantiate the existence of broad diversity across moral communities, especially between 
individualist and collectivist societies. Undoubtedly, the Western focus on individual autonomy 
and self-determination is not universal. In Canadian health care, then, it is essential that health 
care teams understand what kind of norms and values guide a patient’s life. Imposing the 
individualistic process of informed consent on a patient who is accustomed to collective 
decision-making could result in misunderstandings, inadequate consent, and complications with 
care (Lasser 112; Ruhnke et al 1173). Consider, for example, a Korean patient who values 
collective practices of decision-making, and wishes to involve their family or community in the 
process. If the values of this patient are not acknowledged, and they are pressured to make a 
decision in an individualistic manner, their choice to give or withhold consent seems ethically 
problematic. 
 The above study also highlights that family-centered decision-making can be closely tied 
to the value of non-disclosure. This type of communication norm appears to be prominent in 
Chinese, Ethiopian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, and Navajo communities (Turner 106). In 
communities that value non-disclosure, communication between health care professionals and 
patients may look very different (Ruhnke et al 1173). For example, it is not uncommon for 
families to insist that diagnoses and negative prognoses be withheld from ill family members 
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(Turner 105). This seems to be especially true in cases of cancer, as the following case will 
show. 
 In their research, Barbara Koenig and Jan Gates-Williams outline a case that is helpful 
for illustrating the idea of non-disclosure. They recall meeting a patient who had recently 
emigrated from China with his family, and had been diagnosed with cancer (Koenig and Gates-
Williams 245). The patient’s eldest son attended appointments to help with translation, as his 
father was monolingual. When speaking with the father about his condition, the family avoided 
using the Cantonese word for ‘cancer’, instead favoring a more neutral word for tumor (Koenig 
and Gates-Williams 245). Sadly, treatment was ineffective and the cancer became immediately 
life-threatening. When asked to deliver this news, the son became very upset. He explained to the 
researchers, “For us Chinese, we are not used to telling the patient everything, and patients are 
not used to this either. If you tell them, they can’t tolerate it and they will get sicker” (Koenig 
and Gates-Williams 245). In the end, the health care team decided to bring in a Cantonese-
speaking nurse to deliver the news to the patient. 
 Upon reviewing this case, it is clear that the family’s ideas of appropriate disclosure were 
much different than those of the health care team. The son was deeply uncomfortable as, from 
his perspective, he had been asked to do something morally indefensible. The conflict of values 
led to tension between the cultural commitments of the patient's family, and the legal obligations 
of the health care team. Unfortunately, in an already difficult situation, the parties involved felt 
the added burden of moral distress, as they tried to navigate the norm conflict. Such beliefs about 
the power of language and non-disclosure are not uncommon, and they are not exclusive to 
immigrant populations in Canada.  
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 In 1995, Joseph Carrese and Lorna Rhodes started a project to explore the attitudes of a 
Navajo community in Northeast Arizona. They were curious about the community’s attitudes 
towards truth-telling and communication. Through their work, they discovered that most of the 
respondents felt that it was morally indefensible to share bad news with seriously ill individuals 
(Carrese and Rhodes 92). This attitude stemmed from their beliefs about the power of language. 
In this community, there was a strong belief that language did not merely describe reality, but 
shaped reality. So, they felt that discussing negative information could actually cause harmful 
outcomes to occur (Carrese and Rhodes 95). For instance, discussing the possible complications 
of surgery with a patient might ensure that the patient does suffer those complications. 
  Understandably, then, members of this community had profound concerns and 
suspicions about suggestions to discuss advance directives, end-of-life care, and risks of 
treatment (Carrese and Rhodes 93). The community’s health care professionals, instead, made it 
a priority to think and speak in a positive, uplifting manner (Carrese and Rhodes 95). Evidently, 
non-disclosure was a principal value in this community, and is central to the beliefs of many 
others. 
 It is apparent that there is great diversity in what is accepted and expected in health care 
settings. Patients and families may be accustomed to communication and decision-making norms 
that are not supported in the practice of informed consent. Western bioethics emphasizes 
individual autonomy, while many moral communities are centered on social decision-making 
and community agency. Further, informed consent relies on full disclosure and truth-telling, but 
many individuals find this inappropriate, favoring instead caring practices of non-disclosure. 
When faced with illness or injury, patients and family members respond in a number of different 
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ways, and expect different practices of care. As it stands, the process of informed consent takes 
certain norms for granted, privileging certain moral communities, and marginalizing others. 
2.3 Understanding of/Experience with Authority 
 The practice of informed consent is further embedded with values because of the 
involvement and direction of health care professionals. As a result of their training, knowledge, 
and professional abilities, health care professionals hold positions of authority in society. 
Consequently, in their relationships with patients, health care professionals hold a great deal of 
power.  
 In the Canadian process of informed consent, the health care professional involved will 
often make recommendations about a particular course of treatment. These kind of 
recommendations are intended to help guide the patient as they consider their options, and 
eventually, make a decision. The patient is under no obligation to follow the health care 
professional’s recommendations if they prefer to pursue a different care option, or reject 
treatment all together. However, a patient’s inclinations toward authority can have tremendous 
consequences for their pursuit of care. 
 In some cases, an individual’s inclinations toward authority can be traced back to the 
moral community of which they are a member. Some moral communities are structured by 
hierarchical social systems that are central to members’ way of life. In caste systems, for 
instance, society is segregated into groups, where the membership of each is determined by birth. 
Each group has different roles, limitations, and opportunities. Caste systems are most prominent 
in Asia, Africa and the Middle-East, and are exceptionally visible in India among Hindus 
(Sharma 245). If a patient is accustomed to a caste system such that they view health care 
professionals as occupying a high level of the hierarchy, they may not consider that they have the 
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option to disagree with their health care team. As a result, they may automatically accept 
whatever course of treatment is suggested (Lasser 113). 
 Similarly, patients may yield their decision-making agency not because they feel it is 
required of them, but because their moral beliefs make them inclined to trust authority. In one 
study, Martin McKneally and Douglas Martin examined this tendency in Ontario cancer patients. 
They found the feeling of entrustment to be a powerful element of many patients’ experiences in 
the informed consent process (McKneally and Martin 266).  
 At the beginning of their treatment, despite having had very little contact with their health 
care teams, many patients exhibited a great deal of confidence in the intentions and abilities of 
the health care professionals. Many patients believed their health care team cared for them, and 
would work competently and effectively towards a good health outcome (McKneally and Martin 
266). Researchers noted that many patients seemed to idealize the health care professionals, 
focusing on their positive qualities and minimizing shortcomings (McKneally and Martin 266). 
 These patients’ choice to consent to treatment was driven by their inherent trust in – and 
deference to – authority. Many shared that they did not see themselves as making a decision to 
give consent. Rather, they felt they were simply accepting the recommendation of an expert 
(McKneally and Martin 267). This very passive position to consent could be troublesome. It 
contrasts the theoretical understanding of the process of informed consent, whereby patients are 
thought to autonomously weigh the risks, benefits, and possible alternatives to treatment, coming 
to a rational decision. The presence of an authoritative figure, it seems, leads many patients to 
yield their agency.  
 On the other side of this issue, there are many moral communities that have deep-rooted 
distrust towards authority. Often, this is because the community has suffered mistreatment, 
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abuse, and exploitation at the hands of government officials or national institutions (Lasser 113). 
A striking example can be seen in Canada’s Indigenous populations who have endured appalling 
historical relations and ongoing injustice. Indigenous communities have been subject to 
generations of discrimination, mistreatment, and broken promises. Think, for instance, of the 
government-funded forced sterilization of Indigenous women that occurred across Canada, 
peaking in the time immediately after World War II into the 1970s (Pegoraro 162). This legacy 
of colonialism has understandably, left many Indigenous people viewing health care 
professionals with suspicion. 
 The repercussions of this profound distrust is illustrated by Jacklin et al who studied the 
health care experiences of Indigenous people in Canada. They interviewed a number of people 
living with type 2 diabetes who self-identified as Indigenous. Some participants shared that their 
interactions with health care professionals stirred memories of their experience in residential 
schools. This often happened when a health care professional acted in a prescriptive or 
authoritative manner (Jacklin et al 108). Such actions emphasized the power imbalance and 
triggered many participants to feel the need to resist the health care professional’s advice, or 
avoid interactions with them all together.  
 Researchers also noted that there was a prevalent fear among participants of being used 
as “guinea pigs” to test experimental treatments (Jacklin et al 108). There was a suspicion that 
they might be treated differently than non-Indigenous patients. Researchers emphasized that 
these concerns were not baseless as many were derived from past experiences where the 
participants, or members of their community, had suffered such mistreatment. 
 This adverse inclination towards authority is troublesome because it means that patients 
who, justifiably, distrust the health care system may not get the care that they need. The practice 
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of informed consent presumes that patients make the choice to accept or reject treatment 
rationally and objectively. However, when patients have an automatic response (like distrust) to 
health care professionals - even if that response is justified - they may be prevented from 
conducting a fair evaluation of the treatment options. They may prematurely dismiss options that 
are, in fact, well-suited for their condition, and align with their values and beliefs. In this way, 
patients' distrust or suspicion of authority can colour their experience and undermine the 
opportunities that the process of informed consent is supposed to provide.   
 Ultimately, patients’ understanding of, and experience with authority can have serious 
implications for how they perceive the process of informed consent. Patients may automatically 
defer to authority, whether because of the community hierarchy they are accustomed to, or 
because of an inclination to trust authority figures. On the other hand, patients may feel 
substantial distrust and suspicion towards authority after having been subject to mistreatment. In 
either scenario, the authoritative presence of health care professionals influences patients’ 
participation in the informed consent process, and compromises their ability to take control of 
their care. 
2.4 Value Judgements in Medicine 
 Another way that values enter the process of informed consent is through health care 
professionals’ normative judgements. Health care professionals are educated in the ‘hard 
sciences’ (biochemistry, physiology, anatomy, etc.) and are trained to work with objective 
studies and empirical facts. However, there are elements of the practice of medicine that leave 
health care professionals to make value judgements about health and illness. The concern, then, 
is that these normative judgements may affect how health care professionals understand and 
participate in the process of informed consent. 
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 The respective works of Leigh Turner and Renee Anspach reinforce this point. Both 
authors argue that decision-making in medicine is fundamentally social, and that there is not 
always a clear distinction between facts and values (Anspach 215; Turner 114). Studies have 
shown that the judgements of health care professionals’ are based only in part on objective 
information (like a patient’s signs, symptoms, and test results) (Anspach 215).  
 Their judgements are also based on social norms, cultural assumptions about gender, the 
perceived social status of the patient, and the patient’s ability to advocate for themselves 
(Anspach 215). Further, their position will be influenced by their particular understanding of 
health. So, a health care professional may use their expertise to assess the facts of a case, but the 
judgements they form are just as likely to be shaped by norms and social factors. Clearly, then, 
these professional judgements are not value-neutral. 
 One substantial reason that value-laden judgements are of concern is that health care 
professionals often make treatment recommendations to patients. If their judgements have been 
informed by moral beliefs, then the recommendations they offer would seem to be biased. There 
are many unsettled issues in medicine regarding understandings of health and illness. 
Subsequently, for each of these issues, there is a great diversity of opinions among health care 
professionals.  
Consider that judgements regarding health, illness, and normality are necessarily value-
laden. For instance, what is normal functioning? What is considered an impediment or 
disability? What is good health? What is a good quality of life? Although these questions are 
rooted in medicine, they are fundamentally normative. A person’s position on any given issue 
will depend on their moral beliefs and life experience. Evidently, then, a health care 
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professional’s position can affect how they view a particular case and what recommendations 
they offer the patient. 
 Further, such normative judgements can affect the amount of information health care 
professionals disclose to patients. Ontario guidelines on informed consent require that health care 
professionals provide to patients all the information that a reasonable person would need in order 
to make the decision to accept or reject treatment. But who is the reasonable person that policy-
makers have in mind? This guideline can be interpreted in various ways, leaving health care 
professionals to determine the appropriate level of disclosure on their own. The degree of 
disclosure they decide on might be acceptable for some patients, but may result in other patients 
feeling like they have been given an inappropriate amount of information – whether it is too 
much or too little. 
 Next, the subjective beliefs of health care professionals can affect not only their 
recommendations for treatment and what information they disclose, but how the information is 
disclosed. Depending on a health care professional’s beliefs about a case, they will present 
information a particular way (consciously or not). This is concerning because studies have shown 
that individuals will make different choices depending on how options are presented (Gonzales et 
al 2). This occurrence is due to a cognitive bias referred to as the framing effect (Gonzales et al 
2). To illustrate this effect, imagine that individuals are asked to evaluate strategies for 
addressing a hypothetical epidemic (Gonzales et al 2). According to the framing effect, a person 
is more likely to avoid risk when a case is presented in a positive manner (say, in terms of saving 
lives). If, on the other hand, the case is presented in a negative manner (such as the potential of 
minimizing deaths), the person is likely to favor options with greater risk (Gonzales et al 2). 
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 In health care, the framing effect has meaningful implications for the process of informed 
consent. A patient’s decision regarding treatment will likely be affected by whether the options 
are presented positively or negatively – that is, in terms of success or failure, survival or death, 
etc. (Wilson et al 53). A health care professional’s beliefs about a case can have profound 
implications for how they deliver information to the patient, which can directly impact the 
decisions being made regarding treatment. 
 In his work, Barry Hoffmaster draws attention to an apt illustration of these issues. He 
explains that in neonatal intensive care units, there are times when a severely ill baby is allowed 
to ‘declare itself’ (Hoffmaster 1426). This means that the baby ‘makes a decision’ about its care, 
by making a significant turn for the worse, or showing clear improvement that justifies 
aggressive treatment (Hoffmaster 1426). Here, health care professionals and 
parent(s)/guardian(s) defer to the baby to decide how to proceed.  
 It seems clear, though, that this process is subject to one’s beliefs. The parties involved 
must judge what qualifies as a significant turn for the worse, or how much improvement justifies 
treatment. Further, as discussed above, the health care professional’s perception of the case will 
affect what information is disclosed and in what manner, as well as what recommendations they 
offer to the parent(s)/guardian(s). 
 As a final note, it is crucial to recognize that health care professionals sometimes disagree 
about prognoses, which can affect their involvement in the informed consent process. Renee 
Anspach studied this occurrence during her time in a neonatal intensive care unit. She found that 
prognostic disagreements often occur between doctors and nurses (Anspach 227). Anspach 
traced this disagreement to their different “modes of knowing” (Anspach 227). Doctors, who 
spent little time with the infants, often made judgements based on physical signs and symptoms, 
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the results of diagnostic rests, and medical literature. Nurses, on the other hand, spent a great 
deal of time caring closely for the infants and so, often made judgements based on their 
interactions.  
 Anspach’s findings here, are fascinating, but troubling. They suggest that the 
parent(s)/guardian(s) of infants with identical conditions could be disclosed different information 
based on the normative judgements of their respective health care professionals. Different modes 
of knowing, then, can have substantial implications for health care professionals’ understanding 
of a patient’s condition. 
 In all, within the seemingly objective practice of medicine, health care professionals 
frequently make normative judgements about health and illness. There are many unsettled moral 
issues in medicine, and each person’s position on a given issue will be grounded in their own 
modes of knowing, beliefs, and experience. Accordingly, health care professionals understand 
and approach the practice of informed consent in different ways. The position held by a health 
care professional will affect their value judgements about prognoses, what information to 
disclose, the manner that the information is disclosed, and the treatment recommendations they 
offer to a patient. The values of the individual health care professionals on a case, then, shape 
how the patient experiences the process of informed consent. 
2.5 Conclusion 
 In closing, it is evident that informed consent in Canada is grounded in values, and so, is 
not a neutral practice. First, as I have demonstrated, it relies on Western norms of 
communication and decision-making, specifically prioritizing individual autonomy over social 
decision-making, and truth-telling over caring practices of non-disclosure.  
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 Second, it has also been established that many patients have strong beliefs about 
authority, which can affect their perception of the informed consent process. Some are inclined 
to trust authority and may automatically yield their agency to the health care professional. Others 
may have deep-seated distrust and suspicion towards authority, and may feel the need to resist 
help from health care professionals. In both cases, patients’ inclinations compromise their 
autonomy and control.  
 Last, I determined that the normative judgements of health care professionals can have 
substantial implications for patients’ experience of the informed consent process. Health care 
professionals’ moral beliefs can affect how they understand a patient’s condition, how they 
deliver information and how they feel treatment should proceed. Undoubtedly, informed consent 














Chapter 3: Methods and Limits of Accommodation 
3.1 Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, I established that informed consent in Canadian health care is not 
a value-neutral practice. I argued that it is grounded in specific values and moral beliefs, and 
reflects a particular understanding of health and illness. Throughout the chapter, I unpacked three 
significant ways that values are embedded in the practice of informed consent.  
 First, informed consent relies on communication and decision-making norms that are not 
universal. It assumes that patients are comfortable with full disclosure when, in fact, many moral 
communities value caring practices of non-disclosure. It also emphasizes individual choice over 
family-centered decision-making. Second, different patients can have varying inclinations 
towards authority, which affects how they respond to health care professionals' recommendations 
and their ultimate decision to accept or reject treatment. Patients may automatically defer to 
authority, or they may display distrust and suspicion. In either case, their understanding of 
authority can affect their experience in the informed consent process, and compromise their 
ability to control their care.  
 Third, in practicing medicine, health care professionals often make normative judgements 
that influence how they guide patients through the process of informed consent. These 
judgements can impact how they determine prognoses, what information they think is relevant to 
disclose to patients, how they choose to present that information, and what treatment 
recommendations they think are appropriate in a given case. 
 In all, it is clear there are many ways in which values are colouring the process of 
informed consent for patients. In this chapter, I will present strategies for accommodating ethical 
pluralism in the practice of informed consent. First and foremost, I will argue that an active 
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resistance of assumptions should be at the center of health care professionals' practice. It is 
crucial that health care professionals approach patients with an awareness that they are complex, 
unique individuals. I will offer methods that health care professionals can employ to avoid 
relying on stereotypes and come to understand the values that guide their patients' lives. 
Primarily, I will argue that it is crucial for health care professionals to take the time to learn 
about patients' values and beliefs before they begin any discussion about the patients' condition.  
 Second, as we have seen, many moral communities value practices of non-disclosure, 
where negative information is not shared with patients. In light of this, I will argue that, in some 
cases, a 'lower' standard of informed consent may be appropriate. In these cases, patients would 
have a discussion with their health care professional about their beliefs, and request that certain 
information be withheld. This request, in turn, would be noted in the patient's records. 
 Third, I will discuss how to address patients' deference or distrust towards authority. I 
will argue that these two concerns can be addressed in similar ways. I believe health care 
professionals ought to receive additional training focusing on issues of trust, authority, and 
power dynamics. Then, in their everyday practice, they can implement specific strategies 
targeted at building trust, promoting partnership, and balancing power. The goal of this is to 
create meaningful collaboration between the health care professional and patient, where both 
parties are active in contributing to the patient's care goals.  
 Finally, I will suggest that there may be a limit to the possible accommodation of ethical 
pluralism in Canadian health care. The concern regarding health care professionals' normative 
judgements, for instance, is exceedingly complex. I believe that there may not be a way to 
resolve such issues. I will, however, propose methods that may, at least, help to alleviate some of 
the existing tension. 
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 These limits to our accommodation exist due to the structure of the health system, and the 
various types of concerns that we face. Some tensions can be resolved fairly easily. Consider, for 
instance, an Islamic patient who requests that their body be turned to face the East after death. 
Health care professionals can accommodate this patient's wishes without causing much (or any) 
disruption.  
 Other times, however, patients' wishes may be more difficult to accommodate. This 
might be the case if the requests would interfere with care, incur substantial costs, are 
controversial and/or make health care professionals deeply uncomfortable, or violate 
professional or legal standards. For example, imagine a family who requests indefinite life 
support and care for a brain-dead patient, because they believe they are 'still there' (Koenig and 
Gates Williams 248). Or, for an example in the context of informed consent, imagine that a 
family requests that a health care team withhold information from the patient, and refrain from 
disclosing a diagnosis. These more complex cases stand in stark contrast to the first, and 
illustrate a number of the concerns described above.  
 The problem, here, is trying to accommodate ethical pluralism within the existing 
structure of informed consent in health care. As we move through the chapter, it may become 
clear that many of the strategies I put forth are connected. This is because they center on building 
relationships and inclusivity, and learning to approach others with an open mind. 
3.2 Resisting Assumptions 
 In response to the problem of pluralism in Canadian health care, some would suggest 
creating a guide of sorts to which health care professionals could refer. The idea is that the guide 
would outline the beliefs and practices of various moral communities. It is my belief that this 
proposed solution is misguided - the reasons being twofold.  
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 First, I would argue that it simply is not practical to think that such a reference guide 
could be created. The diversity in Canada is vast and growing. Some estimate that there are 
hundreds of moral communities in the country, each with intricate beliefs and practices (Masi VI 
538). Further, it may be the case that a community's beliefs are evolving over time, such that any 
reference guide might quickly become out of date. Second, and more importantly, the apparent 
danger of this kind of document is that it could lead easily elicit stereotyping. If health care 
professionals come to rely on such generalized guidelines, they may make assumptions about 
their patients and overlook important individual features. 
 My proposal, in contrast, is to actively and consistently resist making assumptions about 
patients. A person's ethnicity, culture or religion may be an important part of who they are, but 
simply assigning them to a generalized category based on these features would be irresponsible. 
Stereotyping in this way could lead to inadequate care, patient dissatisfaction, and poor health 
outcomes. As stated by Koenig and Gates-Williams, "patients should never be approached as 
empty vessels, as the bearers of particular cultures" (Koenig and Gates-Williams 247). Coming 
to understand patients' wishes and motivations is a more complex - and in the end, worthwhile - 
project. 
 Of course, this is not to say that health care professionals should not have an 
understanding of the populations they serve. It would certainly prove helpful to be aware of the 
moral communities in the area where they practice. For instance, understanding that many Asian 
cultures prioritize community and family-centered approaches over individualism may help to 
facilitate relationships with patients who express these values. The difficulty, again, is ensuring 
that one does not use this general awareness to make assumptions about any particular patient 
based on their membership in a moral community. 
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 Rather, health care professionals ought to approach patients with the understanding that 
they are complex, unique individuals. Moral communities throughout Canada are not mutually 
exclusive, nor are they entirely distinct from one another (Hamilton 585). A person's moral 
beliefs, then, may represent a mix of ethnicities, cultures, and religions. It is also likely that their 
beliefs have been further influenced by factors like their personal experience and relationships, 
among others (Hamilton 585). In all, any given person's values may be shaped by a number of 
diverse sources that have a bearing on their health care wishes. 
 Given the arguments established in the previous chapter, it is clear that patients often 
approach health care settings with extraordinarily diverse moral doctrines. These values and 
beliefs are often meaningful aspects of the patient as an individual. It may be these moral 
principles on which the patient relies to direct their life. The trouble is that the health care 
professional may be entirely unaware of the presence of these values and beliefs, or their 
significance to the patient, until the provision of care has already begun. 
 It is my assertion that health care professionals can address this issue by having 
thoughtful, intentional conversations with their patients about such matters before they begin the 
process of informed consent. It is crucial that the health care professional start with this 
conversation, to ensure that the patient receives effective and appropriate care. Consider, for 
example, that there are many instances where patients seek medical help while also seeking help 
from a cultural healer (Pachter 691). In these cases, it is essential that the patient's health care 
team is aware of all forms of care the patient is receiving. Otherwise, the patient may be at risk 
of inadvertent drug interactions or side effects. 
 Moreover, by coming to know their patients as individuals first, health care professionals 
will demonstrate their investment in patients' well-being, and foster strong therapeutic 
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relationships. It will make certain that health care professionals are aware of the patients' values, 
beliefs, expectations, and wishes before any treatment is offered. Accordingly, health care 
professionals will be more successful in thwarting the misunderstandings and value-conflicts 
that, as I have demonstrated, can jeopardize patients' health outcomes. 
 Health care professionals can employ this strategy at a number of levels. First, health care 
professionals ought to have a conversation with their patient directly. They can take this time to 
ask questions, and allow the patient to tell their story. This can be an exceedingly useful way for 
the health care professional to learn about the values that guide the patient's life and their goals 
for treatment. At the same time, they can discuss what level of disclosure the patient is 
comfortable with (to be expanded on in the following section), and come to understand how they 
make decisions and on whom they rely for support.  
 Second, it can also be useful to make connections with the patient's family (provided, of 
course, that this is something with which the patient is comfortable). In doing this, the health 
care professional should listen to how the family talks about the patient and their condition. The 
language used can give crucial information about how they understand health and illness, and 
consequently, how the health care professional should present information in subsequent 
discussions. It is also important to recognize any existing power dynamics in the family. 
Consider, for instance, that there may be a family member with a great deal of influence over the 
patient. Understanding the patient's close relationships will allow the health care professional to 
provide more meaningful support throughout the process of informed consent. 
 Third, the health care professional can acknowledge any bigger picture influences that 
may be bearing on the patient. It is important to consider the historical and political context, for 
example, with patients who may have suffered discrimination, poverty, or a lack of access to 
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care. With this, health care professionals should be encouraged to make use of community 
resources. Depending on the case, appropriate resources might be interpreters, community 
leaders, or any other resource that would help to strengthen the therapeutic relationship and 
support the patient. 
 These initial meetings and conversations will help the health care professional come to 
know their patient's values and beliefs. In doing this before they begin to analyse the patient's 
condition, or develop ideas for treatment, they ensure that the patient will receive appropriate 
care. However, this strategy also requires a considerable investment of time and energy. This 
may be demanding for health care professionals who are under pressure to be as efficient as 
possible. In this way, the growing diversity in Canada can be onerous for physicians, nurses, 
social workers, or ethicists who want to deliver effective, patient-centered care. For, in more 
homogenous societies, health care professionals and patients are likely to have a shared 
understanding of what practices are accepted and expected (Koenig and Gates-Williams 246). 
Although these demands on health care professionals are unfortunate, they may be necessary for 
supporting patients' care. 
3.3 Considering a 'Lower' Standard of Informed Consent 
 As you will recall, issues surrounding disclosure are becoming common in Canadian 
health care settings. Many moral communities (like the Navajo) value caring practices of non-
disclosure which are not supported in the current process of informed consent. Throughout the 
literature on disclosure in health care, a discussion has begun to surface regarding the possibility 
of a lower standard of informed consent (Taylor 512). In essence, the idea is that patients could 
request to receive less information from their health care professional. Hence the labeling of this 
practice as a lower standard of informed consent. I argue that this mechanism is a viable and 
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appropriate solution to the current tension between patient wishes, and professional/legal 
requirements. 
 Taylor suggests that, in practice, health care professionals could start a conversation with 
their patient, like those described in the above section (Taylor 512). Throughout this 
conversation, the health care professional would come to understand the patient's wishes 
regarding disclosure. Patients who value non-disclosure could request that particular information 
be withheld, opting for a lower standard of informed consent. With this, the health care 
professional could make note of this request in the patient file (Taylor 512). The note, for 
example, could read "John Smith requested that he not receive information regarding risks of 
treatment when deciding whether to accept or reject treatment". This is just one example of a 
possible mechanism by which a lower standard of informed consent could be supported. 
Certainly, there are other methods that health care professionals could employ to make 
information available to patients without requiring them to access it.  An alternative, for instance, 
could be for the health care professional to create an audio file detailing the relevant information, 
enabling the patient to listen to the file if they so choose
1
. In any case, importantly, the health 
care professional would ensure that the patient knows they are free to revise their position at any 
time, and receive information that had been previously withheld.  
 In this work, it is not my goal to endorse any particular mechanism for practicing a 
different process of informed consent. Rather, I aim to establish the value in allowing patients to 
opt for a lower standard of informed consent, if they so wish. I argue that it is a useful method of 
accommodating ethical pluralism in health care, as it allows patients to control the information 
they receive, ensuring that their care aligns with their values. 
                                                          
1
 Thank you to Katy Fulfer for providing this example. 
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 This concept may be controversial, but I argue that it can be justified on several grounds. 
First, implementing this practice works to support good health outcomes for patients. Consider, 
for example, a Navajo patient who has deep-rooted beliefs that language shapes reality. Such a 
patient may wish not to hear the risks of treatment, as they believe that this discussion will 
directly cause those outcomes to occur. Insisting that this patient hear the risks of treatment, is to 
jeopardize their health (Taylor 512). This is because in some cases, patients with such beliefs 
will refuse treatment after being forcibly told the risks (Taylor 512). The imposition of these 
practices may also discourage such patients from accessing health care again in the future. As a 
result, these patients are vulnerable to suffering worse health outcomes.  
 Next, a lower standard of informed consent promotes the mental and emotional well-
being of patients. Imagine that the Navajo patient, after having been told the risks of treatment 
against their wishes, decides to proceed with treatment. They are likely to experience distress and 
anxiety, as they now feel vulnerable to bad outcomes. It is not, "for example, pleasant to live in 
the belief that one will soon suffer a fatal heart attack, irrespective of whether or not one actually 
does suffer a heart attack" (Taylor 512). Understandably, this kind of fear and dread can be 
irreparable.  
 Finally, allowing patients to opt for a lower standard of informed consent will help to 
foster relationships and build trust. To respect a patient's wishes is to affirm that they are an 
equal partner in the therapeutic relationship. It is to acknowledge the importance of their beliefs, 
and validate their role in the process of healing. 
 Each of the lines of justification described above are also supported by the principles of 
bioethics. Chiefly, the principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, and benevolence. An individual's 
autonomy is their ability to enact self-determination and self-governance (Lützén et al 132). To 
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support a patient's autonomy, then, is to allow them to make their own choices and direct their 
own life. Accordingly, when a patient is permitted to opt for this lower standard of informed 
consent, their health care professional is respecting the patient's capacity to act autonomously, 
and determine what information they wish to receive.  
 Next, the principle of nonmaleficence too, is promoted in the lower standard of informed 
consent. Nonmaleficence calls health care professionals to refrain from causing harm to patients 
in their practice (Beauchamp and Childress 114). With the lower standard of informed consent, 
health care professionals can withhold particular information (as specified by the patient) that 
could otherwise have caused the patient substantial discomfort or distress. Preventing such harm 
is crucial because, as explained earlier, forcing the patient to receive unwanted information can 
jeopardize their physical and mental well-being, causing long-term repercussions (Taylor 512). 
 Last, the option of a lower standard of informed consent would allow health care 
professionals to abide by the principle of benevolence. To act in the spirit of benevolence is 
promote kindness, altruism, and humanity. It is not to merely refrain from doing harm (as with 
nonmaleficence), but to actively advocate for the good of others (Beauchamp and Childress 165). 
With the lower standard of informed consent, health care professionals can offer sensitive, 
effective care. They can tailor the process of informed consent to their individual patient, 
allowing them to live according to their moral beliefs and values. 
 Now, it is clear that there are some concerns with implementing this strategy. Chiefly 
among them, is that a lower standard of informed consent is not supported by professional and 
legal standards, and so, leaves health care professionals vulnerable (Lasser and Gottlieb 113). 
Evidently, the current health care and legal systems are not yet in a place to accommodate such a 
change. That is not to say, however, that they cannot accommodate this change in the future. 
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There are compelling reasons to support this practice. I believe that with relatively minor 
changes to the current professional and legal standards, a lower standard of informed consent 
could be implemented, and could become an integral part of accommodating ethical pluralism in 
health care. 
3.4 Building Partnership to Navigate Distrust 
 One of the principal concerns identified in the previous chapter is patients' perceptions of 
authority, and how these perceptions can compromise the decisions patients make about their 
care. In this section, I will look first, at addressing patients' distrust of authority. To work 
towards a solution for this concern, it is important to understand the nature of  distrust. 
Therefore, I will lay the foundation for my proposal by drawing on some insightful sources of 
literature on the topic. 
 In essence, to trust someone is to be vulnerable to them. As captured by Annette Baier, 
trust is "accepted vulnerability to another's possible but not expected ill will (or lack of good 
will) toward one" (Baier 235). The truster believes that they will not be taken advantage of, but is 
vulnerable to possible negligence, abuse, or ill will at the hands of the trusted. A person is further 
vulnerable to the actions of the entrusted person, even if those actions are motivated by good will 
(Baier 236). The trusted may overstep the scope of that with which they were trusted, and do too 
much. For instance, consider a house guest who unexpectedly paints your living room while you 
are at work because they think the house needs some colour. Surely, the house guest had good 
intentions, but they still did not act the way they were trusted to. On the other hand, the entrusted 
person might be incompetent, and so, fail to act capably and appropriately with that which they 
were trusted (Baier 236). 
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 In health care, patients are vulnerable in their relationship with health care professionals. 
This vulnerability can exist in a number of forms. For one, patients are the ones who have 
reached out, and are seeking help from the health care professional. Patients have to disclose 
personal, sometimes sensitive information about themselves, trusting that it will be kept 
confidential. Additionally, in some ways, they are at the health care professional's mercy in terms 
of receiving prescriptions or being granted access to further tests. In all, patients are put in a 
position where they must trust that their health care professional will act in their best interests.  
 Accordingly, health care professionals can jeopardize trust when they go against patients' 
interests. This could mean that the health care professional does too much and oversteps (like the 
house guest), or does too little and fails to satisfy the patient's wishes. As discussed above, these 
violations of trust can be motivated by intentions that are good, or bad. In any case, violating a 
patient's trust can have lasting repercussions for how they approach health care professionals and 
the health care system in the future. 
 Health care professionals, then, must work to build a relationship with patients who are 
wary or distrustful of authority. There are a number of strategies that health care professionals 
can employ to work towards this goal. To start, it is crucial that the health care professional takes 
time to focus on relationship-building (Thom 1997). They ought to meet with the client and 
participate in an open conversation, as described earlier in this chapter. The health care 
professional should get to know the patient as a whole person, and learn about their values and 
preferences. They ought to empathize with the patient, acknowledging their concerns and goals. 
It is also essential that the health care professional works to balance the power in the 
relationship, and build a partnership with the patient (Thom 1997). This might mean giving the 
patient options for how to proceed and being open to their ideas or suggestions. An important 
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part of this partnership will also include admitting to mistakes, and honouring commitments. 
Overall, the goal of this step is to ensure that patients feel they are an equal in the relationship. 
 Next, it is important to ensure the patient receives competent clinical care. This means 
thoroughly evaluating the patient's condition by going over their history, giving a thoughtful 
assessment and showing a willingness to refer to specialists. The latter can be especially 
important as health care professionals are sometimes viewed as 'gatekeepers' to further care 
(Thom 1997). Then, after having a comprehensive understanding of the patient's condition, the 
health care professional must work to provide effective treatment. This includes ensuring correct 
diagnoses, offering appropriate treatment options, and working hard to help the patient achieve a 
good outcome. Of course, these elements are essential characteristics of good care and, so, may 
already be part of many health care professionals' practice. 
 Addressing distrust in Indigenous patients may, understandably, take more effort on the 
part of the health care professional. Researchers have found that many concerns expressed by 
Indigenous patients are related to the themes of history, trust, and time (Towle et al 344). The 
theme of history refers to concerns about the legacy of colonialism and residential schools 
(Towle et al 344). To address this as a health care professional, one should ensure they 
understand the history of injustice and ongoing mistreatment of Indigenous people in Canada.  
 In the theme of trust, Indigenous patients recounted experiences of health care 
professionals being very impersonal and distant (Towle et al 344). These concerns call health 
care professionals to invest in their relationship with the patient. It is important for patients to 
feel they can discuss their feelings of distrust, and have space to share past negative experiences. 
It is also essential that health care professionals ask questions about the individual's beliefs and 
practices, as they may play a prominent role in the patient's healing. Concerns surrounding time 
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often centered on Indigenous patients feeling rushed and insignificant in the eyes of their health 
care professional. In light of this, health care professionals need to dedicate time to their patients. 
Avoiding rushing patients, and understanding that a good relationship may take time, are critical 
components of this strategy. 
3.5 Addressing Deference with Meaningful Collaboration 
 Just as patients' distrust of authority is concerning for the practice of informed consent, so 
too, is patients' automatic deference. Recall, that deference may take place when a patient is 
accustomed to a hierarchical culture or caste system such that they feel they must yield to health 
care professionals. It could also be that a patient is simply inclined to trust authority and so, 
accepts any recommendations from health care professionals without hesitation. I argue that both 
of these issues can be addressed with similar strategies: i) training health care professionals on 
the dimensions of power, and ii) practicing meaningful collaboration with patients. 
 The goal of this training is to support health care professionals' awareness of the power 
they hold, and come to understand how this can affect the care that patients receive. As a result 
of their extensive knowledge, experience, and expertise, health care professionals have a great 
deal of power over their patients (Gabel 1158). This power imbalance can be compounded 
depending on patients' experience with, or understanding of authority. In this proposed training, 
health care professionals would learn to recognize the power dynamics in their clinical 
relationships. They would be taught about the different forms that power can take, and 
appropriate uses for power (such as advocating for a patient), versus inappropriate uses (such as 
coercion). It is crucial that they have an understanding of how the power they hold can influence 
patients' decisions, and ultimately, their care. 
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 When considering patients who are inclined to trust authority, specifically, it is helpful to 
explore the concept of trust. In his work, Tony Gilbert suggests that there are two types of trust: 
interpersonal and impersonal (Gilbert 569). Interpersonal trust is built between individuals over 
time. It relies on personal qualities, competence, and commitment to standards of behaviour 
(Gilbert 569). Impersonal trust, on the other hand, "is based on the proposition that trust pre-
exists the involvement of any individual and, crucially, does not require knowledge of any other 
individual within the system" (Gilbert 569). Put simply, the person trusts the system in which the 
professionals are situated, and so, automatically trusts the professionals.  
 In the case of health care, impersonal trust is necessary for interpersonal trust (Gilbert 
569). The concern is that patients who have an inclination to trust authority figures rely solely on 
impersonal trust. They do not take the time to assess their health care professional or attempt to 
cultivate interpersonal trust. They yield their autonomy to a particular health care professional, 
based on their perception of health care professionals and the health care system, in general. 
 If the goal is to prevent health care professionals' authoritative presence from influencing 
patients in this manner, it may be that the solution is for health care professionals to withhold 
treatment recommendations. They could provide information about the patient's condition and 
treatment options, but refrain from giving their professional opinion on which treatment is most 
appropriate (Quill et al 764). They could answer all of the patient's questions, albeit, objectively. 
Throughout the process of informed consent, health care professionals would need to avoid 
showing preference for any one treatment over another, even if they feel strongly about the case 
(Quill et al 764). They would need to work diligently to appear neutral. 
 My concern is that restricting health care professionals from offering recommendations 
seems to eliminate the humanity from their practice. It precludes health care professionals from 
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offering guidance based on their expertise or experience, essentially confining them to the role of 
information dispensaries. I believe that this "artificial neutrality" (Quill et al 765) would impede 
their ability to support the patient, and may, ultimately, diminish the therapeutic relationship. 
Additionally, some patients may feel that this practice is patronizing. They may wish to draw on 
their health care professional's counsel as a resource, and resent the suggestion that they are too 
impressionable. 
 In light of these concerns, I propose an alternative strategy. I argue that health care 
professionals should be able to continue offering treatment recommendations by building them 
into a practice of meaningful collaboration with patients. Quill et al have done thoughtful work 
on decision-making practices, which, I believe, can be applied to these issues of authority and 
power. Based on their findings, I will propose suggestions for addressing patients' deference in 
the process of informed consent. 
 To start, health care professionals can engage in open and honest communication with the 
patient and their family. Along with learning about the patient, they can talk about their own 
values and experiences, and admit their biases (Quill et al 765). They should acknowledge the 
power dynamics in their relationship, and discuss the importance of the patient making the 
decision that is right for them. In doing this, it is the hope that the health care professional and 
patient will explore each other's perspectives, coming to understand how they each view the 
situation and what their goals are. Additionally, this communication will allow the health care 
professional to offer more wholesome treatment recommendations, by considering the patient's 
clinical condition as well as their personal values and experience (Quill et al 765). 
 It is important that the relationship is not seen as one-sided, with the health care 
professional simply imparting information on the patient and directing their treatment. Rather, 
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both should understand that they are active, contributing parties. When it is time to evaluate 
treatment options, the health care professional should try to involve the patient in setting goals 
and evaluating progress. Such methods may encourage a passive patient to start taking a more 
active position in their care. 
 Disagreement between health care professional and patient can be seen as an opportunity 
for exploration. It might indicate that the two have different understandings of the condition or 
treatment, or that they have ascribed different meanings to some aspect of the situation (Quill et 
al 766). By determining what they agree on, they can uncover from where, exactly, the 
disagreement stems. Doing this will help to deepen and enrich the therapeutic relationship. It will 
cement the relationship as not only professional, but personal (Quill et al 766). Being able to 
engage in this process without dominating or pressuring the patient will require health care 
professionals to have training about balancing power - as discussed earlier in this section. 
 Of course, in the end,  decisions concerning care rest with the patient. If the health care 
professional and patient still find themselves in disagreement, the former, at least, has a chance 
to come to understand why. Upon understanding the patient's reasons for their position, it may be 
easier for the health care professional to accept the decision (Quill et al 766). If, however, they 
are uncomfortable with the patient's wishes, they have the option to discuss this with the patient 
and refer them to another health care professional. 
 One of the leading assets of this approach is its emphasis on relationships. To withhold 
treatment recommendations altogether, I believe, would be to leave patients isolated, lacking the 
support they may desperately want. This, at a time, when they may be feeling vulnerable and 
frightened in the face of illness or injury. The proposed relationship-centered approach, rather, 
works to build connections between the patient and their health care team (Shepherd and 
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Mohrmann 261). It supplies the patient will all the resources they may wish to access (including 
the opinion of the health care professionals), and empowers them to take control of their care. 
3.6 The Limits of Accommodation 
 If you recall, at the beginning of this chapter I discussed a pair of cases. The two cases 
had different features such that one could be easily addressed, and the other, could not. The first 
was an Islamic patient's request to have his body turned to face the East upon his death. The 
second was a family's request for ongoing, indefinite care for a brain-dead patient. Our ability to 
make such accommodations depends on the specific features of each case. Unfortunately, in 
some cases, the complexity of the issue is so profound that there does not seem to be a 
reasonable path to resolution. 
  I believe this to be true regarding the case of health care professionals' (Acosta-Masquera 
71). In most cases, they are attempting to act objectively and provide unbiased, effective care. 
Accordingly, I do not believe it is reasonable to think that this is an issue which could be 
addressed. Further, while I believe that the influence of one's values on patient care calls for 
attention, it is not clear that the presence of values in health care is something that needs fixing. 
One's values and beliefs are essential parts of their humanity. And, as highlighted earlier, the 
humanity of health care professionals is an important part of the care they provide. It is through 
this humanity that they make meaningful connections with patients, and foster therapeutic 
relationships. 
 So, while I do not believe that this issue can (or maybe, ought to be) resolved, it is worth 
examining. Research on this topic will help us to become more aware of these dynamics in 
health care, and better understand the nature of the issue. It may be that there are strategies for 
making health care professionals more aware of how their personal beliefs affect their clinical 
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judgements and practice. For instance, it may be that health care professionals are encouraged to 
participate in a workshop, during which they practice critical reflection and self-awareness. It 
may be something similar to cultural competence training. In this kind of workshop, though, 
instead of focusing on the beliefs, attitudes and values of patients, they would turn inward and 
focus on their own. 
 Regardless of what direction this research may take, it is crucial that it remains a project 
motivated by knowledge, and not blame. To have beliefs and values that guide one's life is to be 
a human being. It is not, in any way, something deserving of shame or blame. Health care 
professionals, like everyone else, are people driven and shaped by values. Unavoidably, the 
things we care about - consciously and unconsciously - affect the lens through which we see the 
world. 
 Continuing to examine the limits of accommodation, it is worth reflecting on my proposal 
regarding the lower standard of informed consent. Although I believe this strategy works to 
effectively support pluralist patients and ease the tension of the problem of pluralism, it also has 
the potential to create substantial complications. Earlier in this chapter, I discussed how the 
lower standard of informed consent might function for a patient who requests that the risks of 
treatment be withheld. Consider, in contrast, a patient who opts for the lower standard of 
informed consent, and requests that all information about their health be withheld. They insist 
that they do not wish to receive information about any condition they maybe have, or receive any 
form of diagnosis. However, despite their wishes on disclosure, the patient does want to receive 
treatment. 
 Such a case raises difficult ethical and practical questions. If the patient does not wish to 
know about their condition, then, presumably, they do not want to receive information about 
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treatment options either. How, then, are decisions to be made about the patient's care? It would 
seem that the patient is not in a position to make any such decisions themselves, as they would 
be doing so without any context or understanding of the circumstances. Should a substitute 
decision-maker be authorized, just as in the case of an incapable patient?  
 If, by chance, the patient did want to receive information about treatment options and 
make their own decision, it is not clear that the health care professional could deliver the relevant 
information without revealing the patients' condition. Imagine, in any case, that the health care 
professional succeeds in explaining the patient's treatment options without divulging information 
about their condition. It is possible that the patient may select a treatment which is not optimal 
for their particular condition and circumstances. Consequently, the health care professional may 
experience considerable distress. They may believe that the patient has made an ill-advised 
choice, given their ignorance to the critical information about their case. In light of these 
extensive concerns, I believe it is reasonable to argue that there be a limit to how much 
information patients can request health care professionals withhold. 
 These considerations also raise questions about some of the other strategies proposed in 
this chapter. As noted earlier, many of the strategies put forth rely on relationship-building and 
open, honest communication. Recall, for example, my suggestions for addressing patients' 
deference to authority. I argued that health care professionals could engage in meaningful 
collaboration with patients. This would entail conversations where both parties would share their 
values, beliefs, experiences and biases. They would acknowledge the power dynamics in the 
relationship, and work towards a balanced partnership. What, then, of a patient who opts for a 
lower standard of informed consent and requests not to participate in these crucial conversations? 
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If the patient does not wish to have open, honest communication, then the health care 
professional's ability to built trust and partnership is weakened. 
 These challenges can be traced, primarily, back to competing goals and interests. While 
abiding by a patient's request and withholding particular information is to respect their 
autonomy; health care professionals may find this practice deeply uncomfortable. They may feel 
that they are acting against the principle of beneficence, as the patient's health outcomes are put 
at risk. Further, as noted earlier in this chapter, engaging in this lower standard of informed 
consent would violate the professional and legal standards to which health care professionals are 
bound. Evidently, the health care system in Canada is not yet equipped to address these issues, or 
accommodate such requests.  
3.7 Conclusion 
 Of course, I am aware that the strategies I have proposed call for resources - whether it is 
time, money, or effort. This is especially challenging given that resources are already scarce in 
Canadian health care. Health care professionals are under substantial pressure to be efficient, and 
so, rely on short appointment times to see as many patients as possible each day. In order to 
move towards addressing any of these issues, then, health care leaders must first believe in the 
importance of this project. It must be made clear that to accommodate ethical pluralism is to 
ensure more effective patient care, and help meet wider health goals such as adherence to 
treatment. 
 At the outset of this project, I posed a series of questions: How is the practice of informed 
consent in Canadian health care grounded in values? In what ways can we accommodate ethical 
pluralism in health care? What are the limits of this possible accommodation? In this thesis, I 
worked to offer thoughtful and effective answers to those questions. 
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 In Chapter 1, I started by exploring diversity and ethical pluralism in the Canadian 
context. I discussed the ways that distinct value systems emerge and interact with one another, 
and how these value systems can create value-conflicts and tension. It was then that I introduced 
the problem of pluralism, focusing on the existence of ethical pluralism in the Canadian health 
care system. I gave an account of Donald Ainslie's work, and his proposed solution to the 
problem of pluralism: the doctrine of informed consent. I closed the chapter with a 
comprehensive look at how the practice of informed consent functions in Canadian health care 
settings. 
 Next, in Chapter 2, I presented my argument that the process of informed consent in 
Canada is not value-neutral, as implied by Ainslie's view. I demonstrated that informed consent 
is, in fact, rooted in specific values and beliefs, and reflects a particular understanding of health 
and illness. In particular, I examined three significant ways that values are embedded in the 
practice: through decision-making and communication norms, assumptions about patients' 
perceptions of authority, and the normative judgements of health care professionals. 
Consequently, I established that informed consent is value-laden, and so, is not able to fully 
address the challenges of the problem of pluralism. 
 Finally, in Chapter 3, I presented strategies for accommodating ethical pluralism in the 
practice of informed consent. I suggested that health care professionals initiate conversations 
with patients about their values, beliefs, expectations, and goals before any discussion of illness 
or treatment. I also gave arguments to support the idea that patients could opt for a lower 
standard of informed consent, and request that particular information be withheld in their 
decision-making process. Last, I proposed that patients' deference or distrust of authority be 
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addressed by introducing additional training on power dynamics for health care professionals, 
and encouraging health care teams to engage in meaningful collaboration with patients.  
 I also, however, argued that there are important limitations to the possible 
accommodation that can be provided in the Canadian health care system. I suggested that some 
challenges regarding ethical pluralism in health care are profoundly complex, such that 
resolution or accommodation may not be possible. This is the case, I argue, with two notable 
issues: health care professionals' normative judgements, and the potential implementation of a 
lower standard of informed consent. Due to the considerable challenges identified, it is my 
position that these issues cannot be accommodated within the structure of the Canadian health 
care system - or, at least, not yet. 
 The important thing to note, then, is that this project is just beginning. The issues I have 
identified and the strategies I have proposed are merely the start of a conversation. Further 
research is needed to continue this work and shape the strategies that will, hopefully, become 
integral parts of Canada's health care system. Ralph Masi has suggested that, "the art of medicine 
is based on the art of communication, which must encompass compassion, empathy, and 
understanding (Masi VI 538). If, moving forward, this project continues to be guided by these 
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